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Abstract 
The paper revisits the performativity thesis in economics stressing the plural character 
of knowledge, which includes not only scientific models but also every form of practical 
knowledge that systematizes the visible and the articulable experience of economic 
agents. To highlight the point, the paper examines the pricing of options in London in the 
late 19th century, long before the academic origin of modern option pricing models. The 
pamphlets of the time are valuable archives of existing option transactions performed on 
the basis of systematic practical techniques widely established among investors. 
 
Keywords: Performativity, financial markets, option pricing, Foucault, Higgins, 
Bachelier. 
JEL Classifications: A14, G12, N23. 
 
 
  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The performativity thesis has gained some credit in economic discussions, especially 
in the wake of Callon's attempt to emphasize the performative aspect of economics in 
the late 1990s (Callon 1998). Some authors even adopt the term "Callonistics" to refer 
to this approach (Fine 2003, Vosselman 2014). The latter is part of a wider project, 
the origin of which goes back to the 1980s when Callon (1986), along with Latour 
(1987) and Law (1986), put forward the so-called actor network theory (ANT): a 
"new social theory adjusted to science and technological studies" (Latour 2005: 10). 
One of the main insights of this theoretical tradition, maybe the most important one, is 
the role granted to non-humans (i.e. the 'objects' of science and technology) in their 
network fusion with human agents. In this context, the ANT emphasizes the idea of 
socio-technical agencements (Callon 2007: 140) referring to specific sets "of 
heterogeneous human, material, technical and textual devices which, depending on 
their combinations with one another, gain the capacity to act in various ways" 
(Roberts: 2012: 45). Every socio-technical arrangement is object to a performative 
definition. Non-humans are also actors in the sense that they are not "hapless bearers 
of symbolic projection" (Latour ibid.). This viewpoint gives a radically different 
meaning to social dimension and to scientific knowledge in general. 
When it comes to economics, the argument simply implies that the 'economy' is not a 
pre-given social entity, already bounded, identifiable and knowable (Butler 2010, 
Latour 2005: 31-2). The 'economy' comes into being, becoming singular and 
monolithic, mostly because it is performed by the discipline of economics (Callon 
1998). Nevertheless, the argument should be formulated with two important caveats. 
Both of them have been seriously underestimated in the subsequent debates. First, 
when Callon defines economics, it is always "in the broad sense of the term" (Callon 
1998: 2). Economics is thus a plural term including not only different forms of 
scientific knowledge, but also different existing forms of practical non-systematized 
knowledge. As Callon (2007: 332) argued: "academic economics does not have a 
monopoly on performativity" (see also Callon 2010). Second, if economics actualizes 
economic practices, it does not retain any ontological primacy upon the latter. 
Callon's widely cited quotation that economics "performs, shapes and formats the 
economy" may be misleading if isolated from the analytical context of the ANT 
tradition. The very same can be said for MacKenzie's point that economics "does 
things" (MacKenzie 2007: 54). Callon very cautiously emphasized the 
"interdependence" between "economic activities" and economic "ideas" inviting an 
alternative agenda to study their subtle inter-relationship (Callon 1998: 2). This 
relationship should not be seen as one way causality, from economic ideas to reality, 
but as a complex condition of mutual presupposition. In other words, scientific and 
non-scientific knowledge has ontological implications in capitalist reality without 
maintaining any ontological primacy over social practices. Theoretical and practical 
ideas do not create reality. They make it possible being simultaneously provoked by 
it. This viewpoint suggests that the agent position is necessarily a discursive position 
since all experience relies upon the discursive conditions of the prevailing forms of 
knowledge. 
Several authors have come up with more concrete applications of the above analytical 
agenda (see Callon 2007, MacKenzie et al. 2007). In the context of modern financial 
markets, the most influential one is definitely MacKenzie's attempt to reconsider the 
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importance of the standard option pricing formula on the construction of derivative 
markets (MacKenzie and Milo 2003). The approach of MacKenzie has triggered 
important discussions with regard to the nature of contemporary financial 
engineering, being proved a critical theoretical moment in the dissemination of the 
performativity agenda in the discipline of economics. On the other hand, by focusing 
solely on a particular pricing model of a particular financial product (options), the 
very same approach has downplayed the two abovementioned crucial caveats of 
performativity. If the effects of a particular scientific model are assessed against the 
complexity of economic reality, then two misunderstandings may easily arise. First, 
since no model can enjoy a full performative monopoly, someone may infer that the 
performativity thesis is inadequate to capture the range of economic ontologies. 
Second, someone may also argue that when it comes to the description of the 
mechanisms that actualize the existing economic practices, the role of non-scientific 
practical knowledge (which is innate in the experience of agents) may also be equally 
important. As a matter of fact, these two points capture the majority of the critiques of 
the performativity thesis. 
The paper revisits the debates on the idea of performativity in economics, focusing on 
the workings of derivatives markets. Its main aim is to reformulate the performativity 
thesis addressing the misunderstandings that result from the case-specific definition of 
it. To clarify the analytical point, it returns to Foucault's theoretical intervention. 
Foucault not only offers a thorough understanding of the mutual immanence between 
economic practices (power relations) and knowledge but also puts forward a wide 
definition of the latter that is plural. It is not restricted to scientific forms but also 
encompasses every form of practical knowledge that systematizes the visible and the 
articulable experience of economic agents. Every isolated theoretical model by 
definition cannot enjoy the monopoly of performativity because it is only the plurality 
of knowledge that performs the complex economic reality. This is in line with Butler's 
suggestion that the failure of a scientific model is not against the account of 
performativity (Butler 2010). At the same time, the workings of economic practices 
can be performed by non-scientific forms of practical knowledge. 
In order to clarify our point we refer to a historical case study: the London options 
markets in the late 19th century, that is, before any academic systematization of 
pricing techniques. Option markets existed and flourished long before the publication 
of Black and Scholes’ famous paper in 1973. At the end of the19th century, in his 
influential pamphlet, Higgins tellingly explained one possible way of how 
experienced investors and brokers of the time priced option contracts. Higgins' text 
provides a thorough account of the established trading practices: investors were able 
to isolate and atomize risk by replicating portfolios with the same pay-offs, use a 
proxy close to average deviation to measure risk, rely on volatility trading to provide 
a pricing anchor, introduce several rules of thumbs to extend pricing to more exotic 
securities. This is a unique historical example which shows that sophisticated hedging 
practices were not academically led and, in general, do not necessarily presuppose 
scientific theoretical models for their workings. By saying so, we do not mean to 
underestimate the implications of academic knowledge in the workings of financial 
markets. Nevertheless, the complex reality of everyday transactions in the London 
option market was indeed actualized by a non-simplistic set of practical techniques 
and ideas. This case study supports the plural definition of the performativity 
approach. 
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Higgin's archival recording of market transactions offers a valuable account of OTC 
financial transactions. Derivatives transactions rarely left any historical trails before 
the post-Bretton Woods era (Weber 2009) and, in fact, we are covering a period that 
has been repeatedly characterized in the literature as "a statistical dark age" (Hannah 
2007). The paper also argues that Higgin's insights foreran to some extent the seminal 
intervention of Bachelier on option pricing. In other words, according to Higgins, 
investors were solving in a practical way a similar pricing problem that was 
analytically approached by Bachelier's famous dissertation. Given the performativity 
thesis, this finding should not surprise  : Bachelier's major analytical achievement was 
to provide a formalized expression of the established everyday practices. To put it in 
Foucauldian terms, in both cases of Higgins and Bachelier, the knowledge that was 
already performing the options transactions crossed a certain epistemological 
threshold being academically archived. A finding also in line with the performativity 
agenda. 
 
2. On the issue of performativity 
2.1 The agenda of performativity in financial (derivatives) markets 
Discussions about the social dimension of modern financial markets, with a particular 
emphasis on derivatives markets, have taken an interesting twist after MacKenzie's 
idea to apply the performativity thesis to the developments in options markets in the 
wake of the appearance of Black, Scholes and Merton option pricing formula (BSM 
henceforth1) (MacKenzie and Milo 2003; MacKenzie 2007). MacKenzie in his 
analysis draws heavily upon Callon's theoretical intervention to introduce the idea of 
performativity in the study of economic phenomena: economics "in the broad sense of 
the term, performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how it 
functions" (Callon 1998: 2, see also Callon 2007). The concept of performativity 
actually has a long history in the analysis of social phenomena (especially in politics) 
and may take different meanings in the interventions of different authors. In general, 
the performativity thesis argues for an immanent relationship between statements and 
acts or theory and reality (Deleuze and Guattari 2013: 62). Or alternatively, as Butler 
(2010: 147) puts it, "performativity starts to describe a set of processes that produce 
ontological effects, that is, that work to bring into being certain kinds of realities." 
The mutual immanence between theory and reality is the crucial link in the above line 
of thought. Scientific theories and models (like every other 'language' in general) are 
already embedded in the socio-technical context of the reality they attempt to describe 
(Callon 2007: 318, 320-21). Thus, the relation between theory and reality is neither 
one of 'creation' nor one of 'reflection', but one of mutual presupposition and capture. 
Here lies the standard misunderstanding of the argument by its critics (see Vosselman 
                                                 
1 It is well known that Merton came to the same differential equation and the same solution quite 
independently from Black and Scholes. There were significant differences in the way they addressed 
the problem. The famous trio was not the first to derive option pricing equations. Samuelson should 
also be mentioned, because he revived Ito calculus and Merton should be also given some extra credit 
for putting Ito calculus to work in financial theory (he also "held off on sending his alternative 
approach to journals, so that Black and Scholes could receive appropriate credit for their discovery" 
Weatherall (2013: 114)). For more on the story see (MacKenzie 2007; Weatherall 2013; McCauley 
2009). 
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2014). The performativity thesis argues for a theoretical representation that 
"progressively discovers its world" and the world that "is put into motion by the 
formula describing it" (Callon 2007: 320). In this sense, theoretical knowledge does 
not only transmit some content but conveys the way the subject relates to this content 
producing particular ontological effects in society (see Zizek 2006: 16). 
In the context of financial markets, financial theory and mainstream modeling let the 
world they describe become actual. Financial economic theory is performed "by a 
combination of actors and technologies to produce a world similar to that outlined in 
the abstract economic theories" (Muellerleide 2013: 1632). This is exactly the 
viewpoint that MacKenzie (2007: 54) extends to options pricing: economics "does 
things" rather than "describing an external reality that is not affected by economics." 
To clarify his case-specific point, MacKenzie approaches the performativity thesis 
from the perspective of a particular model. An aspect of economic theory (model) 
may be: (i) performative in a generic way (generic performativity), when it is 
generally used in economic processes, (ii) performative in an effective way (effective 
performativity), when it has a considerable effect on economic processes, and (iiii) 
'Barnesian' performative, when it brings about exactly a state of affairs it predicted 
and described in the first place (ibid.: 55, 66). This distinction between different levels 
of performative effectiveness of an economic model captures at the same time the 
different historical phases of the BSM pricing formula, which is the main focus of 
MacKenzie's intervention. The BSM pricing formula initially made just a simple 
difference (generic performativity) in the workings of options markets, but gradually 
gained a dominant position lessening the discrepancies between the model predictions 
and the actual market prices (Barnesian performativity). Nevertheless, after the 1987 
financial crisis, while "option theory is still performed in the generic and effective 
sense," its "canonical model has lost its Barnesian power" (MacKenzie 2007: 76). The 
general conclusion from Mackenzie's analysis is that the performative power of a 
particular model is by no means stable and guaranteed: its performative strength may 
significantly vary. 
This latter point raises the issue of the breakdown in the performative strength of a 
theory or a model. Performative inefficiency and/or breakdown is the major concern 
of the critics, who usually highlight discrepancies between anticipations based on 
theoretical models and real social outcomes (see Fine 2003: 480; Santos and 
Rodrigues 2009: 998; Mikes 2009; Svetlova 2012). The point is that, since a 
particular model or theory can hardly predict the workings of the complex market 
reality, the performativity agenda is either wrong (in its strong version) or falls into a 
naive truism (in its weak version). This issue has also been critically addressed by 
Butler in her defensive appraisal of the performativity thesis. For Butler, economic 
theories "do sometimes fail, and they are always brokering failure, whether or not 
they do actually fail" (Butler 2010: 152). The real challenge thus for the 
performativity agenda is to built fallibility into its analytical account (ibid.). 
But, if fallibility is built into the very core of the performativity argument, how can it 
be properly theorized? MacKenzie (2007: 77) introduced the concept of "counter-
performativity" to describe how the Barnesian stage of strong performativity may be 
also undermined by the very use of the same model: unilateral adoption of a model 
may easily backfire. This is a genuine indication of performative failure, but it is not 
adequate for a coherent explanation of the whole process. In order to understand the 
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latter, we must abandon the constrained singular perspective of a particular model 
when we discuss economic performativity. If a model loses its performative power, it 
is because other theoretical aspects, practical knowledge and agents' worldviews 
become more strongly explanatory. The reality of economic and social practices is 
complex and flexible and, thus, the nature of the performativity approach is 
necessarily multiple and plural, not model-specific. This is how Callon (2010: 165) 
attempts to get around the problem: 
Markets [...] are complex realities that can be configured differently, as each 
configuration can be designed to respond to particular orientations and requirements. 
This diversity − and on this point the performativity programme adds something 
essential − stems partly from, and to some extent is expressed in, the plurality of 
theoretical frameworks devised to account for the various aspects of market functioning. 
Market reality is complex and, thus, the performativity approach "makes it possible to 
exhibit the struggle between worlds that are trying to prevail" (Callon 2007: 332); that 
is, struggle between different competitive forms of knowledge. The latter includes not 
only academically systematized theoretical forms, but all sorts of practical knowledge 
and individual viewpoints, which are embedded in the existing market practices 
(ibid.). In other words, the performativity agenda can incorporate the fallibility 
moment only when it approaches the issue of knowledge from the perspective of 
plurality: markets are actualized by a diverse setting of a knowledge that may take 
alternative and contradictory forms. 
Knowledge is always performative in the sense that it does actualize a complex 
reality. In fact, knowledge is immanent in the latter. Nevertheless, it is crucial for the 
performative agenda to keep the content and scope of 'knowledge' as wide as it 
actually gets in reality. In this regard, we should abandon the micro-perspective of a 
particular model in favor of a macro-viewpoint of knowledge as system as a whole. 
Knowledge is a plural, diverse, complex and contradictory set of statements and 
visibilities (perceptions) under different forms of systematization, which does not 
always cross the threshold of 'scientificity' (theoretical and empirical knowledge). 
This formulation invites, indeed, a Foucauldian type of reasoning. 
2.2 On the Foucauldian nature of performativity 
In what follows, we draw upon Deleuze's reformulation of Foucault's theoretical 
project (Deleuze 2012). Foucault's performative approach stresses the mutual 
immanence between knowledge and social relations (Deleuze 2012: 62). The former 
must be seen as something plural and generic: it comprises combinations and different 
forms of the visible (perceptions) and the articulable (statements) of agents' 
experience. Put simply, the domain of knowledge captures not only scientific 
(academic) production in the form of theories and models, but also any possible form 
of practical knowledge including "even the experience of perception, the values of the 
imagination, the prevailing ideas or commonly held beliefs" (ibid.: 44). In this sense, 
there is practically nothing outside and prior to such definition of knowledge. The 
performative part of Foucault's argument emphasizes the mutual capture and 
presupposition between social practices and knowledge. Different forms of 
knowledge are "always already completely caught up within power relations which 
they presuppose and actualize" (ibid.: 69). Knowledge is inseparable from the 
diagram of social relations which make it possible, and social practices are not 
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independent from the forms of knowledge which actualize them. Social practices 
invoke theoretical and/or empirical forms of knowledge, while the latter can only 
become recognizable in relation to the corresponding social relations (Foucault 1977, 
2003; see also Deleuze 2012: 33, Balibar 1997). 
Hence, a social institution can be seen as the complex coupling, co-existence, and co-
integration between social relations and particular forms of knowledge. The latter 
passes through scientific, systematic and/or spontaneous forms of individual 
experience (seeing, speaking, thinking) in order to actualize the former (Deleuze 
2012: 65). It is this particular coupling that makes up social institutions, like financial 
markets. A social institution is the concrete assemblage, in which certain forms of 
knowledge bring to life the abstract social technology (diagram) which is embedded 
in the social relations. 
This short diversion through Foucault's conception of performativity adds a different 
angle to the above-mentioned discussions. Modern derivatives markets are definitely 
an institutional coupling between related practices of risk trading and particular forms 
of knowledge (theoretical or practical), in the way described above. Financial markets 
are made possible when a certain set of financial knowledge is performed by a proper 
conjunction of actors and technologies. MacKenzie's intervention is brilliant without, 
nevertheless, avoiding analytical limitations. The BSM option pricing model heralded, 
actualized and to some extend led actors performance in the brand new landscape of 
modern risk trading. The model formalized and refined practices of dynamic hedging 
that were already in place in the increasingly liquid financial markets (Mixon 2009: 
171, Weatherall 2013). It was a genuine no-arbitrage model for pricing in a financial 
world built upon the principle of arbitrage and liquidity. The performative strength of 
the model could not be perfect and guaranteed, since it was only just one aspect in the 
new plural setting of modern financial knowledge. In this sense, it could not but be 
immanent fallible. But this result does not contradict the performativity thesis. It is 
totally in line with the overall argument. Market reality is actualized by a plurality of 
forms of knowledge; different individual elements (models, practical techniques, 
prevailing ideas and beliefs) within this plural diversity necessarily loses more or less 
their individual performative efficacy. 
This type of reasoning anticipates and answers to a significant extent some of the 
critiques of the performativity thesis.2 Santos and Rodrigues (2009: 992) find the 
strong notion of performativity "too demanding" and the weak version "trivially true" 
(see also Fine 2003 for a similar point). For them, "the weak version makes the milder 
claim that economics is actively engaged in market building" (ibid.: 998). 
Nevertheless, they miss the basic point of performativity that the complexity of 
market engineering does not rely on single theoretical models and their 'manipulative' 
use by agents, but on a set of different forms of knowledge that actualize the 
conjunction between actors and existing technologies. These forms of knowledge are 
not external instruments to actors but shape the visible and articulable experience of 
the latter calling forth particular norms of behavior. In this line of reasoning, every 
theoretical model and/or practical technique is necessarily immanent in the material 
reproduction of social practices and not extraneous 'virtual' ideological models that 
runs contrary to the 'real' economic transactions (as argued by Miller 2003, see also 
Fine 2003). 
                                                 
2 For relevant debates see Callon (2007), Vosselman (2014). 
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Neither is the idea of "calculable cultures," put forward by Mikes (2009, 2011) and 
Svetlova (2012), enough to reject the performativity argument. For this theoretical 
literature, a model loses its monopoly on performativity because there are different 
institutional designs and rules ("calculative cultures") that determine "how models are 
used and made to account for decisions" (Svetlova 2012: 420). Risk management 
decisions by portfolio managers are not solely based on particular models, regardless 
of how prevailing and popular the latter may be. Decision makers use the model 
output as only a starting point "for further inquiries and exercise of judgment" (Mikes 
2009: 33). Managers have their own understanding, personal knowledge and 
expectations, a valuable practical knowledge of the existing financial practices, which 
is also a crucial determinant of decisions and related actions: "model users account for 
unrealistic assumptions and neglected factors by applying their own judgments" 
(Svetlova 2012: 422; see also Mikes 2009). This is a good point but not a genuine 
critique to the performativity thesis because the latter already includes the practical 
non-scientific element of agents´, experience. Model-specific performativity fails 
because in practice it is just one form of knowledge along with other practical forms 
that also inform and guide the decision making. The performative fallibility of a 
particular fragment of knowledge means that only the whole setting of the existing 
forms of knowledge (in its plurality) is substantially performative in the strong sense 
of the term.3 
In order to clarify our viewpoint, we examine evidence from a particular historical 
case study in financial markets that has been only marginally discussed in literature: 
option pricing at the end of 19th century, that is, before the modern formalization of 
stochastic calculus embedded in the BSM option pricing model. 
3. A case study: option pricing before stochastic calculus 
In recent financial studies and textbooks, one can easily find many historical 
illustrations of the use of derivatives that go back in time, even in the distant past 
(Markham 2002: 4-5; Haug and Taleb 2011: 100). Nevertheless, besides some rare 
quotations and infrequent historical references, there is "widespread ignorance 
concerning the history of derivatives," a fact that is indicated by the relative "dearth of 
research in the history of derivative trading" until recently (Weber 2009: 432). This 
'dearth' in the historical research can be explained (to some extent) by the fact that 
until recently "there are few historical records of derivatives dealings. Derivatives left 
no paper trail because they are private agreements that have been traded in over-the-
counter markets for most of their history" (ibid.). Nevertheless, one can refer to many 
intriguing historical illustrations:4 primary forms of derivatives on sovereign debt can 
be found as early as 1390 in Venice; futures contracts were common on the 
Amsterdam Exchange by 1610, playing a crucial role in the famous Tulip Mania that 
arose around 1636; put options and ‘refusals’ (call options) were being widely traded 
in London by the end of 17th century; in 1821, a broker from the London stock 
                                                 
3 The discussion about performativity cannot be exhausted in the context of a single paper. We do not 
examine here the nature of the mutual immanence between knowledge and social relations. While our 
argument builds on the Foucauldian idea of performativity, we do not fully agree with the way that 
Foucault himself theorizes the unity between power and knowledge. In this respect our argument is 
informed by Balibar (1997). See also Sotiropoulos et al. (2013), LiPuma and Lee (2012), Roberts 
(2012). 
4 See Markham (2002) and Allen (2001). 
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exchange complained that the trade in options was “now so frequent as to constitute 
the greater part of the business done in the House” (cited in Chancellor 2000: 97). 
The revival of interest in derivatives trading has drawn attention to some early 
approaches to option pricing (in English, French and German), which were hitherto 
neglected and forgotten (see Weber 2009, Haug 2009, Haug and Taleb 2011, Hafner 
and Zimmermann 2009, Kairys and Valerio 1997, Mixon 2009, Sotiropoulos 2015, 
Jovanovic and Le Gall 2001, Poitras 2009). All these early approaches to derivatives 
can be seen as evidence in favor of the version of performativity developed above. 
Derivatives markets involve practices that have been actualized by corresponding 
forms of knowledge. Before the rise of modern financial theory at the beginning of 
the 1950s, this financial knowledge existed mostly in practical and non-formalized 
state. All the early approaches to derivatives are theoretical outcomes appearing 
when the existing practical knowledge crossed a certain threshold of scientificity and 
formalization gaining historical visibility. As Leonard Higgins emphasized in the 
preface of his influential treatise on option pricing in the end of the 19th century: 
The writer of the following pages feels that, in publishing this little book on Options, he 
may be telling many of his professional friends what they already know perhaps better 
than the author. If, however, he succeeds in supplying in a readable form an answer to 
the question which has so often been put to him by the uninitiated, viz., "What is an 
Option?" and in placing before those who have mastered the intricacies of Option dealing 
the Theory of the "Value of the Put-and-Call" in a somewhat new light, the object of his 
little book will be attained (Higgins 1896, preface; emphasis added). 
In the above introductory passage, Higgins actually feels that he does not add a single 
new element to the everyday practical knowledge of his professional colleagues in 
option trading. He merely attempts a systematization hoping to approach the very 
same question in a new light. The rest of the paper will focus on Higgins´, 
intervention for several reasons. Higgins was describing option transactions in the 
London market, the "par excellence" option market of the world (Higgins 1896: 58; 
Filer 2013). His approach was quite influential in the English-speaking literature 
among market experts on both sides of the Atlantic (for instance Nelson (1904) draws 
heavily upon it). He was also drawing heavily upon the dominant trading practices of 
the time and thus his approach is not just a systematization but also a valuable 
historical archive to study. 
The following analysis explains why this neglected historical case is intriguing and 
significant in its own right. It is also related to the above discussions on 
performativity in an important way. It supports the broader definition of the 
performativity thesis, as opposed to the restricted model-specific one which is usually 
preferred and debated in the literature (e.g. Mackenzie et al. 2007). Pricing techniques 
in financial markets have been systematically developed in practice long before the 
academic publication of related formalized models (Rutterford 2004). And 
sophisticated option trading was possible long before the perfecting of the BSM 
pricing model in the 1970s on the basis of a knowledge spontaneously developed in a 
practical form in the everyday experience of market participants. 
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4. Higgins' pricing approach 
Of the few existing accounts of option trading before the First World War in the 
Anglo-Saxon world, Leonard Higgins’ pamphlet, initially published in London in 
1896, was the most influential (Higgins 1896). This pamphlet was not the first of its 
kind in circulation. Two decades earlier, in 1877, Charles Castelli had published a 
relevant book on options trading (Castelli 1877). While Castelli focused mostly on the 
definition of different types option securities and the description of their basic 
workings, Higgins additionally provided a thorough analysis of existing pricing 
techniques. Higgins was not only interested in informing the public about the 
available risk hedging strategies, but also attempted to advise brokers on the proper 
pricing rules they should comply with. Less than a decade after Higgins' publication, 
in 1904, Nelson attempted to describe options markets from the other side of the 
Atlantic, also dealing with transatlantic abritrage (Nelson 1904). His analysis drew 
heavily upon the work of both Castelli and Higgins, but was undoubtedly most 
influenced by the latter (indeed, on pricing, Nelson reproduces Higgins’ entire chapter 
on this). All three authors explicitly state that they do not bring anything new to the 
existing established hedging practices in the market, but they just systematize this 
practical knowledge offering new perspectives for practical use. 
The following analysis is focused on Higgins' approach on London option 
transactions. The time period of the issued options (the "option period") "may be said 
to range from a few hours to six months" (Higgins 1896: 2). In London at the time, 
the standard contract was the European-style option issued at-the-money (Haug 2009: 
476),5 usually covering 100 shares and being negotiated in the OTC market. Out-of-
the money options, known as 'special options', were not traded often while there is no 
indication in the writings of the period that there was a secondary market (Haug 2009: 
476). Given the shape of equity markets of the time (Rutterford 2004), options were 
held until maturity. 
Higgins describes a complex pricing mechanism connecting the value of option with 
the volatility of the underlying security. Investors could isolate and atomize risk by 
replicating portfolios with the same pay-offs, use a proxy close to average deviation to 
measure risk, rely on volatility trading to provide a pricing anchor, apply several rules 
of thumbs to extend pricing to more exotic securities, allow for a discount rate and a 
counterparty risk, and finally include a fair profit for the broker's market making 
service. 
4.1 Atomization of risk 
In the first four chapters of his pamphlet, Higgins provided the standard definitions of 
options along with simple practical examples highlighting different aspects of their 
workings. As well as call and put options,6 he also introduced, inter alia, so-called 
                                                 
5 In practice, options were issued at a strike price that was adjusted from the spot price to reflect the 
option premium of the contract as well as the time value of money expressed through the discount rate 
(Mixon 2009: 176). 
6 In general, an option gives the holder the right (not the obligation) to buy or sell the underline asset at 
a future date and an agreed strike price. This right costs something, therefore unlike futures the 
purchase of an option requires an up-front payment. There are briefly two basic types of options: rights 
to buy are named call options (or simply calls) while rights to sell are called put options (or simply 
puts). 
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‘put-and-call' options (the title of his pamphlet) or straddles.7 Higgins also associated 
options with a certain conception of risk. He approached them as sui generis forms of 
private insurance: as insurance "against unlimited risk" (Higgins 1896: 64). The value 
of an option was defined, thus, as an insurance premium. 
Higgins devoted a significant part of his analysis (chapters V to VIII) explaining how 
to replicate payoffs between different portfolios made by options and the underlying 
shares. For instance, describing simple "hedging operations" between puts, calls and 
shares with the same strike price, he summarizes some standardized market 
transactions (Higgins 1896: 26): 
That a call of a certain amount of stock can be converted into a put-and-call of half as 
much by selling one-half of the original amount. [...] That a call can be turned into a put 
by selling all the stock. [...] That a put-and-call of a certain amount of stock can be 
turned into either a put of twice as much by selling the whole amount, or into a call of 
twice as much by buying the whole amount. 
This passage along with some of Higgins' illustrations are extensively quoted by 
Nelson. Haug and Taleb (2011: 103) have already picked up this point. In the analysis 
provided by Higgins and Nelson, one can easily see a practical but thorough 
understanding of the co-called put and call parity: that is, a certain pricing relationship 
between simple portfolios including a put and a call. Moreover, one can also find a 
series of relevant rules based on the portfolio replication idea, quite similar to those in 
the above quotation (ibid.). In other words, quite spontaneously and on the basis of 
the system of their hedging positions as a whole, investors were actually defining and 
trading risks in the context of a metonymic process by replicating portfolios with the 
same payoffs. 
The above process is definitely a process of atomization of risk. The numerous 
examples offered by Higgins reflect the fact that the complex and multi-faceted 
financial transactions of the time un-bundled and re-bundled the payoffs of different 
portfolios and therefore isolated, singled out and traded different risks associated with 
the underlying securities.8 As we shall further see below, the option pricing technique 
offered by Higgins is based on volatility trading, that is on buying and selling 
portfolios made by a put and a call of the same maturity and strike price. Investors 
may have not been fully aware of this aspect of their everyday practices, but their 
ordinary hedging techniques were modes of performing and actualizing a particular 
abstract technology of risk atomization. 
The way that risks are defined and atomized is associated with the institutional 
context of the market. There are different ways that the risk atomization can be 
performed, that is, different institutional settings of portfolio replication. This is clear 
if we compare option markets at the time Higgins was writing with relevant 
contemporary transactions. Contemporary stock option markets are extremely liquid, 
with quotation frequency being a large subdivision of the second (Durbin 2010). This 
                                                 
7 Straddle was the US term of the same financial contract, which is now the universal term for this 
combination of a put and call option at the same strike price. 
8 Following contemporary literature, we shall call "atomization of risk" the "unbundling and re-
bundling of the payoffs and hence of the risks associated with primitive financial products and 
primitive securities" (Borio 2007: 2). See also Steinherr (2000) and also Sotiropoulos et al. (2013) for a 
thorough analysis of this aspect of risk trading. 
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was not the case at the end of the 19th century when options markets were relatively 
small in size, over-the-counter negotiated and contracts were mostly issued at-the-
money and held until maturity. BSM option pricing is fundamentally based on 
continuously dynamic hedging, so that a portfolio made by an option and its 
underlying share could always adjusted in order to replicate a hypothetical risk-free 
security (McCauley2009, MacKenzie 2007, Sutton 2000). This type of hedging was 
unthinkable when Higgins was writing. The BSM option pricing model performs a 
different risk atomization based on the no-arbitrage condition in a financial landscape 
dominated by dynamic arbitrage investment strategies. 
4.2 Marketization of risk 
Following contemporary financial jargon, we shall call marketization of risk (Borio 
2007) the particular solution to the pricing problem within the existing institutional 
framework. In terms of the above analysis, we can say that risk marketization is the 
historic-specific (institution-specific) solution to a pricing problem as performed by 
the prevailing theoretical or practical models. 
Higgins, from the very first moment in this analytical account, linked the pricing of 
options to the measurement of risk.9 The calculation of "probable risk" (and, thus, the 
price of an option) is, in fact, a statistical exercise that can offer a "fair" value. In 
practice, however, prices may be slightly different according to bargaining on the 
basis of the “speculative impulse of the moment” (Higgins 1896: 65). For Higgins, the 
estimation of the option premium is much more complex that the actuarial insurance 
calculations,10 mostly because of the erratic, unstable and changing character of 
financial markets. This is a prelude to a primitive version of the (discrete) random 
walk hypothesis: 
in nearly every instance in active speculative stocks, the chance of a rise or a fall is, to 
borrow a sporting expression, "even money betting" (Higgins 1896: 36). 
The next crucial step in his pricing technique is volatility trading. Higgins understood 
that the anticipated price of the put-and-call at maturity is a fair estimation of the 
expected price volatility of the underlying security. Put-and-call is the simple 
combination of a put and a call with the same strike price and expiration date. The 
profit from writing (selling) a single put-and-call is depicted in Figure 1. This figure 
cannot be found in Higgins’ analysis but it is clear that he is fully aware of the 
workings of this contract. Line AEC shows the profit for the short call. With this, the 
investor sells someone else the right to buy the underlying security at a pre-specified 
date in the future (expiration date) and at an agreed exercise price K. At the maturity 
day, the other party will not exercise this right if the spot price S is lower than K (it is 
totally unreasonable to buy something at a higher price K than the spot price S). In 
that case, the investor's gain would be the up-front premium c (equal to OA in the 
                                                 
9 Castelli (1877) does not offer a pricing technique in his analysis. He just describes alternative hedging 
methods given option prices. Higgins devoted chapter XI to calculating a fair value for options. He is 
clear on the distinction between fair value and price (Higgins 1896: 64). Nelson quotes Higgins' entire 
chapter XI on option pricing in his own pamphlet. 
10 The difference is merely the amount of available data, how many people over how many time 
periods, which is more difficult to get for shares than for life expectancy. Given these limitations, any 
kind of risk assessment is acceptable, provided that "it can do sufficient business to establish an 
average" (Higgins 1896: 67). 
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figure) he had received when he issued the call. On the other hand, if the spot price S 
is higher than the strike price K, our investor’s counterparty will exercise the call 
option, buying the underlying security at the pre-specified price K which is now lower 
than the spot price S. In that case, our investor will face losses equal to: c-(S-K), given 
by the line EC. In quite the same way, it is easy to show that the profit from the short 
put will be given by line DBF: for spot prices higher than K the counterparty will not 
exercise the put option, selling something at a lower price than the existing one. We 
get the final profit from the short straddle position (line GHI) if we add the two option 
profits. What is important for our analytical scope is to see that a fair premium of the 
put-and-call (the money that the issuer would receive) should be equal to price 
volatility: c+p = KL or MK. The price of the put-and-call reflects the anticipated price 
dispersion of the underlying security. 
Figure 1 
The straddle (put-and-call) 
 
 
Unlike contemporary financial theory, Higgins does not use standard deviation (or 
variance) as a proxy for market price dispersion but another similar measure which is 
close to the so-called average deviation. Of course, there is a very close connection 
between these two statistical variables. But the average deviation captures better the 
distance KL in Figure 1 which is the "average value" for the put-and-call reflecting the 
"average past fluctuations" (Higgins 1896: 70). Anticipated average deviation based 
on past data is, thus, a good proxy for the price of the put-and-call. In fact, Higgins 
traces share price fluctuations: 
from week to week over a period of seven years from January, 1888, to December, 1894. 
The price of each week has been compared with those of the previous week, fortnight, 
month, two months, and three months (the fluctuations being carried out in columns), 
and averages have been taken over the whole period in question (Higgins 1896: 66). 
Since stock prices follow a random walk (see above), Higgins warns that the 
anticipated average deviation has a time dimension and varies according to the period 
until maturity: the longer the period to maturity, the higher the average value of put-
and-call (Higgins, ibid.). If past data are to be used for estimation of the average 
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deviation, the calculations should take different time frequencies into consideration: 
the expected average deviation for a two month contract should be the average of a 
series of past two-month deviations and so on. In his calculations he uses seven years 
of historical data and provides a table with results for different shares and times to 
maturity (see Figure 2). He sees that as a safe method − a "fair basis" − that takes into 
consideration the average influence of many different sources (risks) of price 
volatility (Higgins 1896: 66). 
Figure 2 
Expected average deviations on the basis of past data as estimated 
by Higgins to price put-and-call contracts. 
 
 Source: Higgins (1896: 76). 
 
Figure 2 presents the expected volatilities for different types of securities as estimated 
by Higgins. These volatilities are interpreted as "average values" for the put-and-call 
contracts. Since underlying security prices are assumed to follow a random walk, we 
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expect the volatility to increase with time to maturity. At the same time, less risky 
securities like Consols experience lower price volatility.  In other words, the riskier 
the stock, the higher the expected price volatility. 
The final step in Higgins’ pricing solution is to allow for some additional ‘costs’ that 
the broker may encounter. Some of these costs appear in Figure 3. Anticipated 
average deviation gives us the “average value” of the contract, mostly reflecting the 
risk of underlying security. But this is not the end. The dealer should take into 
consideration a series of transaction costs, such as: dealer’s working cost (1/8%), a 
reasonable profit margin (1/2%), interest expenses (1/8%) and an extra risk premium 
for “other contingencies” (1/8%), which may include unexpected changes in volatility 
or interest rates and counterparty risk (“provision for possible default on the part of 
the giver," Higgins 1896: 70). On the top of these regular costs (this does not appear 
in Figure 3), the dealer may have to exploit special circumstances in the market – i.e. 
a “financial strain” or special economic and “political complications” (ibid.: 70). 
Figure 3 
The final price of a put-and-call 
 
 Source: Higgins (1896: 73). 
 
The calculation of the price of the put-and-call offers Higgins an ‘anchor’ for the 
overall pricing of options. Investors can price put-and-calls using volatility 
estimations. Similar transaction in our days are known as volatility trading. The 
abovementioned straddles along with other standard simple combination of puts and 
calls (under other 'exotic' names as: strangles, butterflies etc.) are so common in 
contemporary markets that “they are quoted and priced as if each was its own security 
even though each is really a set of multiple securities” (Durbin, 2010, p. 82). This was 
also the case in London option market at the end of 19th century. On the basis of 
volatility trading, investors could then replicate various portfolios made up of 
combinations of put-and-calls together with ordinary puts or calls (risk atomization 
process). The latter could thus be priced.11 
 
                                                 
11 Although the standard practice was to issue options at-the-money, Higgins also offers a practical rule 
to give a proxy for out-of-the money option writing. While he understands that an out-of-the money 
put-and-call will have a different premium from the standard at-the-money one, he assumes that the 
put-and-call price should be treated as unaffected if the difference between the share price and the 
strike price K is less that 25% of the anticipated average deviation. 
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4.3 A brief diversion: Higgins and Bachelier 
The above steps in Higgins's analysis comprise a pricing technique, which, in 
practical terms, gets quite close to the famous option pricing formula of Bachelier. 
It is widely known that Louis Bachelier submitted in 1900 to the University of Paris 
his dissertation thesis under the supervision of Henri Poincaré. The title of the 
dissertation was: Théorie de la Spéculation, and its theme focused on financial pricing 
(options on French government bonds), significantly diverging from the standard 
mathematical areas of interest of the time. This is the basic reason why the 
dissertation did not get a distinction: "the grade was a respectable 'mention 
honorable', not the 'très honorable' that would have assured Bachelier a first-class 
ticket to an august mathematical career" (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2008: 45). Poincaré 
recognized some original insights in the thesis but actually observed that: "the subject 
chosen by M. Bachelier is a bit distant from those usually treated by our candidates" 
(cited in ibid.: 45). The other professors did not find the analysis sufficiently rigorous 
(Sutton 2000: 39). After the rediscovery of the thesis by Savage (who informed 
Samuelson) in the mid-1950s, Bachelier’s dissertation is now considered as one of the 
most remarkable PhD theses ever written in economics, heavily anticipating modern 
financial theory (Sutton 2000: 35). 
The basic insight of Bachelier was the random walk hypothesis: stock prices are 
equally likely to rise or fall, thus the best forecast of tomorrow's price is today's price. 
Higgins adopted the very same condition as entry point in his analysis. He was 
describing real trading practices in illiquid option markets and, therefore, he had a 
discrete version of a random walk in mind (see above). The major accomplishment of 
Bachelier was that he developed the mathematics of continuous-time random-walk 
processes, known today as Wiener processes. Bachelier's thesis "predates by five 
years the paper by Einstein, who independently developed the analysis of such a 
process and applied it to the modeling of Brownian motion (the movement of small 
particles in a liquid)" (Sutton 2000: 36). On the basis of this mathematical 
formalization, Bachelier could estimate the premium of a European option c (like 
those traded in London at the time of Higgins). This premium is given by the 
following expression (contrary to the contemporary solutions to option pricing, the 
formula below assumes risk neutral investors12): 
  0,)(max KTpEec Tr       (1) 
where p(T) denotes the stock price at expiration date at time T in the future, K is the 
strike price and r is a discount rate (continuously compounded). Equation (1) simply 
says that value of a call today should be equal to the discounted future payoff of the 
contract at maturity. The call will not be exercised if p(T)<K, otherwise its payoff will 
be given by the different p(T)-K. The only unknown is the price at maturity of the 
underlying share p(T). Bachelier assumed that this price "could be described by a 
normal distribution whose standard deviation increased proportionally with the square 
root of T" (Sutton 2000: 38). That is: 
TaT )(      (2) 
                                                 
12 The BSM solution, on the other hand, assumes the more fundamental condition of risk-averse agents. 
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Equation (1) could be mathematically solved, but the resulting prices depends on the 
parameter a in equation (2). Bachelier estimated a by calculating "the standard 
deviation of the 'day to day' changes in the stock price over some period in the recent 
past" (Sutton 2000: 38). 
British option traders of the time were not aware of the mathematical tools that 
Bachelier introduced in the pricing solution.13 The systematic fusion of financial 
theory and advanced statistics did not happen before the 1950s. In illiquid markets 
where options are issued at-the-money and held until maturity (and in the absence of 
advanced computing machines), investors tend to think in discrete terms and not in 
the context of the Wiener process. Nevertheless, in the institutional conditions of the 
time investors worked out a practical solution to option pricing that shares the same 
basic insights with Bachelier's formalized approach. 
The crucial link in Higgins’ pricing technique was the value of the put-and-call. 
Volatility trading in random markets was the starting point. On the basis of the above 
notation, the value of the put-and-call can be expressed by equation (3):14 
       0),(max0,)(max TpKEeKTpEepc TrTr    
    KTpEeTpKKTpEepc TrTr   )()(,)(max          (3) 
When Higgins' estimates average deviations on the basis of past data, he is practically 
solving a pricing problem similar to that of Bachelier. He lacks the mathematical 
formalization to deal directly with equation (1), that is why he places the put-and-call 
at the centre of his pricing technique. The value of the put-and-call is given by the 
expected market volatility of the underlying stock as captured by the anticipated 
average deviation. That’s why he estimates from historical market data the last term in 
the equation (3) above: the expected size of the average deviation, E[|p(T)-K|].15 He 
assumes price randomness, but, since his approach is not mathematical, he does not 
rely on any (restrictive) price distribution as Bachelier (who adopted normal 
distribution). He simply assumes any standard deviation that past data imply: 
  )()( TKTpE       (4) 
In plain terms, Higgins describes a practical version of option pricing that anticipates 
the basic analytical assumptions of Bachelier's subsequent formalization. This by no 
means understates the analytical importance of the latter. Investors were performing 
practices of risk atomization and marketization, substantiating a particular version of a 
sophisticated financial technology. They were isolating risk, unbundling, re-bundling 
and replicating portfolios, trading volatility, inventing practical pricing rules of thumb 
and setting forth complex hedging option transactions. In the intervention of Higgins, 
and primarily of Bachelier, aspects of this practical knowledge marginally crossed a 
                                                 
13 Jovanovich's bibliometric analysis shows that the overall mathematical contribution of Bachelier was 
by no means negligible but only in the discipline of mathematics. Its rediscovery by economists 
"provided not so much an analytical support as a kind of handy 'off-the-shelf' historical ancestry for the 
nascent field of modern finance" (Jovanovish 2012: 444). 
14 This is the standard textbook payoff formulas for long puts and calls. 
15 Under the assumption of random walk, the strike price of the put-and-call is equal to the expected 
price in the future. 
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certain scientific threshold, being expressed henceforth, not only in terms of market 
statements and visibilities (in everyday practices), but also as archived and 
systematized forms of knowledge (to put in Foucauldian terms). 
 
5. Conclusion: Option pricing then and now 
In this paper we have revisited the performativity thesis in economics. We particularly 
focused on MacKenzie's seminal intervention to apply the analysis of Callon to option 
pricing theory. MacKenzie's version of the performativity thesis is model-specific: it 
stresses the different degrees of performative strength that a particular aspect of an 
economic theory (model) may have. In this paper we have argued that some of the 
critiques of this approach can be incorporated into the performativity agenda in the 
context of an alternative approach, which abandons the model-specific emphasis. 
Economic institutions in general, and options markets in particular, are social 
condensations of assembling social practices and forms of knowledge that actualize 
them. This paper adopts a wider definition of knowledge following Foucault's 
writings. Knowledge is a social set that contains not only the plurality of scientific 
(academic) formulations, but also all sorts of (systematic or not) practical experience. 
As a historical illustration of our point (case-study), we focused on option pricing at 
the end of the 19th century. 
Option markets existed and flourished long before the publication of Black and 
Scholes’ famous paper in 1973. At the end of the 19th century, Higgins tellingly 
explained one possible way of how experienced investors and brokers of the time 
priced options. This is a unique historical example which shows that sophisticated 
pricing and hedging practices do not necessarily presuppose formalized scientific 
models. The complex reality of everyday option transactions was actualized by a non-
simplistic set of practical techniques and ideas, which only marginally crossed the 
threshold of 'scientificity' (being properly 'archived') in the few pamphlets published 
by practitioners. In the Anglo-Saxon discussions, the most influential intervention was 
that of Higgins. The latter anticipated the major insights of the now famous 
Bachelier's thesis (but not the brilliant mathematical formalization) and used these 
insights to put forward a practical pricing technique. Until now, this analytical 
connection has not been discussed in the literature. Yet, it also works in favor of the 
performativity agenda and runs against the mainstream (mis-)representation of the 
history of derivatives markets (see Weber 2009). Bernstein (1996: 247) has argued 
that before the rise of modern financial theory: "it never occurred to anyone to define 
risk with a number. [...] Risk was in the gut, not in the numbers." Higgins's text is a 
glorious proof against this line of reasoning. 
The paper might be the first one to decipher and emphasize Higgins' stand-alone 
approach but it is not the only one to discover and discuss it. A few authors do 
mention him in passing in the context of early contributions to option theory. 
Nevertheless, this paper, being loyal to the performativity agenda, does not read 
Higgins’ argument through the lens of modern financial theory. Higgins pamphlet is a 
unique archival recording of the established forms of practical knowledge that helped 
investors to perform the economy before the rise of modern financial theory. In this 
regard, the analytical connection between Higgins and Bachelier should not come as a 
surprise: they both drew upon the same financial landscape which was becoming 
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concrete, visible, measurable and, thus, performable through deeply rooted practical 
forms of knowledge one could not reach in library shelves. Therefore, we do reject the 
teleological perspective according to which every early systematic account of 
derivatives should be appraised in relation to the BSM canonical model.16 
  
                                                 
16 This methodological approach is clear in the intervention of Kairys and Valerio (1997). Other 
authors, like Mixon (2009) or Haug and Taleb (2011; see also Hah 2009) argue that the early works on 
options reveal that "option traders and academics in the past were much more sophisticated than most 
of us would have thought" (Haug 2009: 472). Nevertheless, in either case, the canonical BSM models 
is the ultimate measure of analytical comparison. This perspective looses the institutional footing of 
financial practices. 
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